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This thesis examines the costs and benefits of two onsite energy opportunities for 
Command Naval Region Hawaii (CNRH) and the surrounding region. The project 
analyzes a proposed 50-MW solar photovoltaic (PV) system on West Loch Peninsula in 
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and the economic impacts of a proposed liquid natural gas (LNG)-
import terminal on Waipu Peninsula in Pearl Harbor, using net present value (NPV) and 
cost benefit analysis. CNRH is considering collaboration with Hawaiian Electric 
Companies to pursue the proposed PV plant and the LNG terminal in order to meet 
Hawaiian Clean Energy Initiative requirements for producing 40% renewable energy by 
2030. The goal of this project is to calculate the economic impacts an LNG-import 
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Hawaiian Electric Companies (HECO) has overstated projected reductions in utility rates 
that may be realized by transitioning to liquid natural gas (LNG). HECO has 
communicated to Command Naval Region Hawaii (CNRH) that it expects utility costs to 
drop by 20–30% after building an LNG-import terminal (CNRH, 2013). Such a reduction 
is unlikely, because even a 50% reduction in fuel cost (the maximum savings projected 
by FACTS Global Energy and Galway reports) would result in only a 21% reduction in 
HECO’s 2013 total operating expense. This research estimates a 10–21% reduction in the 
utility rate as the maximum possible while maintaining the same operating margins. 
The average annual rate to produce electricity with solar photovoltaic (PV) 
technology is projected to be $0.088/kWh. The average annual rate to deliver LNG to 
Hawaii is calculated at $0.10–$0.18/kWh. However, these figures are not directly 
translatable into utility rates. The solar PV rate does not consider grid tie-in costs, 
upgrades to advanced smart-grid technology, or the utility-scale storage that would be 
required to accommodate fluctuations in current under dynamic weather conditions. The 
LNG cost ignores the expense of transporting fuel from an import location to the power 
plant, the costs of operating a power plant, modernization and replacement of aging 
generators, and other ancillary expenses. While replacing LS diesel with LNG will almost 
certainly realize savings, further research is required to determine if LNG will reduce 
utility rates more than renewable energy. 
BENEFITS FOR CNRH AND HECO 
Building an LNG-import terminal in Pearl Harbor would be a mutually beneficial 
project for CNRH and HECO. CNRH would benefit by $32.2 million per year and HECO 
by $170–$460 million on average per year, based on projected net present value (NPV). 





HECO’s best alternative for a LNG site would be $50 million more expensive 
than locating the project at Pearl Harbor. For its part, CNRH will likely save $32.2 
million annually in utility costs if an LNG terminal is constructed at Pearl Harbor.  
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LEASE AGREEMENT 
The “zone of possible agreement” (ZOPA) theory suggests the most likely lease 
agreement would be reached at the midpoint between acceptable terms. In this case, the 
midpoint between HECO and CNRH would be $8.9 million per year. 
Ultimatum theory suggests that when both parties stand to gain from a zero-sum 
transaction, the party with the lessor terms will not agree without a payout of 20% or 
more (Thaler and Mullainathan, 2008). This perspective places the lease rate at no less 
than 20% of HECO’s economic benefit of $170 million per year, or $34 million per year.  
THE SOLAR PV ALTERNATIVE 
The solar-PV project is very attractive because of the $280–$800 million NPV for 
a 50-MW system at West Loch. However, the NPV does not include grid tie-in costs, 
smart-grid upgrades, or electrical-storage costs incurred to address significant 
fluctuations in electrical current. This study found that CNRH could invest a maximum of 
$280–$800 million in the excluded costs and still enjoy a positive NPV. The projected 
cost savings are largely attributed to whether electricity from the utility company can be 
displaced by the renewable energy generated or the renewable energy must be sold back 
to the utility company. The latter scenario would result in buying electricity for $0.28 per 
kWh and selling electricity for $0.19/kWh. The first scenario, CNRH using the energy 
produced, would reduce the quantity of electricity consumed at $0.28/kWh in essence 
saving $0.09 for every kWh used. 
Building an LNG terminal will reduce the reimbursement rate which the utility 
company reimburses renewable energy. A 30% reduction in the utility reimbursement 
rate will result in a $200 million NPV loss for a 50-MW solar-PV system over 30 years. 
The renewable-energy reimbursement rate is determined by HECO’s “avoided energy 




the yearly cash flow paid by the utility company for solar-PV energy could be 30% less if 
an LNG-import terminal is installed. The only way to avoid drastic reductions in the 
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This thesis is an economic analysis of proposed solar photovoltaic (PV) and liquid 
natural gas (LNG) opportunities for Command Naval Region Hawaii (CNRH). The 
opportunities have arisen from Hawaii’s abnormally high cost of energy and the Navy’s 
interest in reducing carbon emissions while realizing cost savings. This report is an initial 
investigation into two projects that are potentially worth tens of millions of dollars to the 
CNRH and hundreds of millions of dollars to Hawaiian Electric Companies. To achieve 
carbon-emission and cost reductions, CNRH must pursue strategies that are consistent 
with Department of Defense and Hawaiian policy while meeting the highest standards of 
today’s best engineering practices. While this report touches on public policy and 
engineering standards, it does not purport to be an authoritative source on either. The 
tools and calculations in this report may be altered and updated as Hawaiian policy and 
technical standards change.   
A. BACKGROUND 
CNRH is considering two opportunities to reduce energy costs. The first is the 
installation of approximately 50 MW of ground-mounted solar-PV panels on the West 
Loch Peninsula, on Pearl Harbor Naval Base. The second proposed project is a land lease 
to an unidentified private entity that would install an LNG-import terminal on Middle 
Loch Peninsula, also on Pearl Harbor Naval Base. A large quantity of the imported LNG 
would be piped to Hawaii Electric Company (HECO’s) power facilities and used to 
replace diesel in thermal power generators. Both the solar-PV plant and the LNG-import 
terminal are projected to reduce CNRH’s extremely high energy costs. 
1. Costs 
Hawaiian energy is expensive for multiple reasons, according to Jay M. Ignacio, 
president of Hawaii Electric Light Company (HELCO), a subsidiary of Hawaiian Electric 
Industries (HEI). The first is that the islands lack economy of scale, due to a small 
customer base and low customer density (HELCO, 2014). Utility companies in the 
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continental United States typically benefit from more customers and higher customer 
densities, which reduces costs overall (HELCO, 2014).  
Second is Hawaii’s geographical isolation. Considerable investment has been 
made in grid-infrastructure security, with many areas left for improvement (HELCO, 
2014) Grid infrastructure security refers to factors that ensure the provision of stable 
electricity at all times.  
Third, an additional high-tech distribution infrastructure is required for “variable 
generation” (renewable-energy) power producers to prevent harmful effects from large 
fluctuations in current and frequency (HELCO, 2014). In 2013, renewable energy 
constituted approximately 18% of the total energy production in Hawaii and this share is 
projected to grow (DBET, 2014). HELCO quotes a EURELECTRIC report that states, 
“Treatment of islands is not straightforward. Island [utility] markets are different and 
therefore require a different approach that is both reasonable and proportionate” 
(EURELECTRIC, 2012).  
Two factors contribute to HECO’s high fixed costs. First, owing to its isolation, 
Hawaii is unable to purchase power from neighboring utility companies that feed into a 
connected grid. Second, the large penetration of variable generation raises costs 
(HELCO, 2014). HECO is required to maintain spinning reserves higher resulting from 
higher penetration or renewable energy than its counterparts, which increases costs. 
HECO facilities therefore have an average fossil-fuel utilization rate of ~25% according 
to FACTS Global Energy (FGE), which did not find fault in the operational management 
of HECO’s fossil-fuel plants (FGE, 2012).  
HECO’s power generation is largely dependent on oil, and thus vulnerable to oil-
price volatility (HELCO, 2014). In 2012, 71% of Hawaiian power generation was based 
on oil, and 15% on coal (DBEDT, 2014). In addition, because Hawaii’s renewable-
energy compensation plans are incentivized from unused oil, renewable-energy 
compensations are also subject to oil-market volatility (HELCO, 2014). 
As a result, the price of electricity in Hawaii is three times higher than the 
national average (DBEDT, 2014). In addition to the burden of high electricity rates, 
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HECO is also struggling in modernizing its infrastructure to meet pollution standards, 
according to the State of Hawaii Public Utility Commission (PUC, 2013). In 2012, 
Hawaii was 71% dependent on oil for power production, compared to 1% for the United 
States (DBEDT, 2014). In the same year, the continental United States was 37% 
dependent on coal, which is the least environmentally friendly fuel for power generation, 









Figure 1.  Electricity Production by Source, 2012 (DBEDT, 2014) 
2. Public Policy 
The PUC has become increasingly concerned over HECO’s business operations 
and has used strong language to criticize the growing divide between desired PUC 
initiatives and those that HECO currently pursues. One example is found in a 2013 PUC 
document stating that “ratepayers at each of the HECO Companies are growing 
increasingly frustrated by high electric rates and poor customer service” (PUC, 2013b). 
The PUC noted that Maui Electric (a subsidiary of HEI) had been held financially 
accountable for inefficient performance—the PUC ordered a reduction in base electricity 
revenues of $7.7 million from current levels and a refund of more than $8 million to rate 
payers (PUC, 2013b). Furthermore, Maui Electric’s authorized profit level was reduced 
(PUC, 2013b).  
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While the PUC and HECO have expressed a desire to work together to improve 
customer service and reduce electricity rates for “customers” (HECO) and “ratepayers” 
(PUC), the PUC has essentially taken a hardline stance toward HECO. This dynamic is 
extremely important to understand in evaluating the PUC’s willingness to approve an 
LNG-import terminal.  
HECO is characterized as a monopoly and is therefore tightly regulated by the 
PUC. Credit-rating agencies, such as Standard and Poors (S&P), view the relationship 
between the utility and the PUC as a significant factor in the utility’s credit rating (NPR, 
2012). S&P gave Hawaiian Electric Industries Inc. a BBB- rating in February 2014, 
which is the lowest investment-grade credit rating (Hawaiian Electric Industries Inc, 
2014), citing “strong” business risk and a “significant” financial-risk profile (Hawaiian 
Electric Industries Inc., 2014). The implication is that HECO has to pay high interest 
rates for money, a problem when contemplating a large investment such as an LNG-
import terminal; thus HECO will likely rely on a third party consortium to obtain 
financing for the proposed project (CNRH, 2014).  
There is a significant ideological divergence between HECO’s pursuit of LNG 
and the PUC’s preference for renewable energy. The PUC wrote in its guidance to 
HECO,  
The costs of fuel and purchased power constitute the largest components 
in today’s high bills for electricity customers and represent major strategic 
opportunity for lowering electric rates…. Therefore, to further stabilize 
and lower the costs of generation, the HECO Companies should 
expeditiously: 
• Seek high penetration of lower-cost, new utility-scale renewable 
resources 
• Modernize the generation system to achieve a future with high 
penetrations of renewable resources 
• Exhaust all opportunities to achieve operational efficiencies in 
existing power plants 
• Pursue opportunities to lower fuel costs in existing power plants 
In carrying out these goals, the Commission puts forward the following 
guidelines for the review of future generation-related project in each of 
these areas. Aggressively Seek Lower-Cost, New Utility-Scale Renewable 
Resources… New generation resources should lower system costs and 
maximize use of cost-effective renewable resources” (PUC, 2013). 
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These guidelines emphasize that the PUC wants HECO to invest in renewable 
resources (PUC, 2014) (or as HECO puts it, variable generation [HELCO, 2014]). The 
PUC also wants HECO to modernize current plants and find new ways to lower fuel 
costs. While the latter could involve the use of LNG, the PUC’s failure to mention the 
proposed $100+ million import terminal among its priorities is significant.  
Increasing the use of LNG is not entirely dependent upon the construction of an 
import terminal. Hawaii Gas is already shipping containerized vessels to Oahu (EIA, 
2014), and HECO is pursuing containerized LNG vessels, pending approval from the 
PUC (Shimogawa, 2014b). An article in Pacific-Based News states that  
Hawaii Electric Co. has selected a finalist for a project to supply and 
deliver to the state’s largest electric utility hundreds of tons of liquefied 
natural gas to be used as a replacement fuel for power generation across 
Hawaii, the incoming head of the Honolulu-based company told PBN 
Tuesday (Shimogawa, 2014b). 
The PUC report cited docket No. 2013–0381 as stating that  
…the average levelized price of the utility-scale solar PV projects 
included in the Application is 15.576 cents per kWh (calculated without 
state tax credits), which is significantly lower than HECO’s avoided 
energy cost of electrical generation 22.697 cents per kWh in November 
2013 (PUC, 2013).  
The PUC cites HECO’s records in finding that it is 30% cheaper to produce power via 
solar PV than the “avoided energy costs,” which is HECO’s cost to produce energy. 
However, the PUC did not consider additional costs. Hawaii Administrative Rule 6–74 
defines “avoided energy costs” as including the cost of fuel, electrical generation and 
operation, and maintenance (Department of Budget and Finance, 1998). Additionally, 
avoided energy costs can include fuel inventory costs, working-cash costs, and line-loss 
costs, which are considered when presented in a specific proposal from a qualifying 
facility (Department of Budget and Finance, 1998). What is not considered in avoided 
energy costs is the cost of adding infrastructure upgrades such as smart-grid technology 
or utility-scale electrical storage to the grid to accommodate renewable energy (e.g., 
solar, wind), which will be required when renewable penetration exceeds 20% (HSIS, 
2012). Therefore, the PUC reference to 15.576 cents per kWh is technically correct in 
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terms of the definition of avoided energy costs, but it is improperly used because higher 
penetrations of renewable energy are accompanied by expensive infrastructure upgrades 
(PUC, 2014). This problem will continue as renewable-energy distribution grows from 
18% in 2013 to exceed 20%. (PUC, 2014) (DBET, 2014) (HSIS, 2012). 
A study conducted by FACTS Global Energy, funded by the Hawaii Natural 
Energy Institute, an affiliate of the University of Hawaii, finds that,  
Some people worry that LNG will be so cheap that it will challenge 
renewables. This is a strange kind of logic, since it in effect is an argument 
that the best thing for Hawaii renewables would be if the customers all 
paid the highest energy prices possible. If that is to be State policy, then 
LNG is a bad idea. Our analysis here assumes that State policy is to lower 
prices within the HCEI framework, not keep them high. (FGE, 2012)  
Before an LNG-import terminal is further explored, understanding PUC priorities 
is essential. These include aggressive pursuit of lower costs, new utility-scale renewable 
resources, and reduced fuel costs in existing power plants (PUC, 2014). It remains 
unclear whether lowering these fuel costs by means of an LNG-import terminal is 
consistent with the PUC’s intended framework.  
3. Solar PV 
The high cost of electricity presents many opportunities for solar PV in Hawaii, as 
well as challenges. Installation of solar PV has rapidly grown, due to a significant cost 
reduction in panels, increased federal and state tax incentives, more stringent emissions 
targets, and a rise in available financing for renewable energy projects (Rocky Mountain 
Institute, 2014) (Medelsohn and Harper, 2012) (Medelsohn and Kreycik, 2012) (Strand 
and Seligman, 2013). The Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) found in 2013 that solar PV 
in Hawaii was more cost effective than local utility rates (RMI, 2014). In 2013, 
renewable energy constituted approximately 18% of total energy production in Hawaii 
(DBET, 2014). Solar PV contributed 4.3% of the renewable total, but it is the fastest-
growing sector in the Hawaiian renewable-energy market (DBET, 2014). Figure 2 shows 
solar as a percentage of total renewable-energy generation in Hawaii. Figure 3 shows the 
number of PV systems installed in Hawaii as of 2013. Figure 4 shows cumulative solar-
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PV generation in MW per year. Figure 5 lists completed utility-scale solar projects in the 
State of Hawaii.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Solar Energy as a Percentage of Total Renewable Generation in 




Figure 3.  Quantity and Capacity of PV Systems (DBET, 2014) 
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Figure 4.  Total Photovoltaic (PV) Generation by Year (GWh) (DBET, 
2014) 
 
Figure 5.  Existing Utility Scale Solar Projects (DBET, 2014) 
According to HECO, the cumulative PV power generation capability in 2013 was 
221 MW, generated from 29,558 different systems (DBEDT, 2014). HECO believes that 
the growing employment of solar PV, with its variable-generating nature, “present[s] a 
severe risk to the security of the system” (HELCO, 2014). Fluctuations in demand for 
electricity were met with fast-start diesels and simple-cycle combustion turbine 
generators in 2012 (HELCO, 2014), which, being able to operate quickly, were used to 
mitigate fluctuations in wind and PV generation (HELCO, 2014). As the supply of 
renewable energies increases, the grid will become more vulnerable if corrective actions 
are not taken. 
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The Rocky Mountain Institute wrote in 2014 that solar-PV-plus-battery and diesel 
generators in commercial systems were either as cost effective or below parity with the 
Hawaiian grid (RMI, 2014). In the same report, RMI projected that by the end of 2014, 
solar-plus-battery will be on par with the grid for commercial applications, which could 
lead to mass defection from dependence on the utility (RMI, 2014). The study noted that 
as more people defect from the grid, the utility’s fixed costs will be distributed among 
fewer ratepayers, thus hastening the “death spiral” coined by Liam Denning in a 
December 2013 Wall Street Journal article (RMI, 2014) (McMahon, 2014).  
4. Liquid Natural Gas 
HECO seeks to curb the high costs of energy production by using liquid natural 
gas (LNG) instead of costly low-sulfur (LS) fuel oil or LS diesel. A 2012 study by FGE 
states that “LNG could provide fuel savings in the Oahu power sector of 30–50% or more 
compared to oil” (FGE, 2012). The study calculated that savings in 2020 would range 
from 31–47% contingent on fuel costs delivered to Oahu, if LNG demand is greater than 
0.5 mtpa, and if U.S.-built Jones Act-compliant carriers from the U.S. West Coast could 
deliver the LNG to an onshore facility (FGE, 2012). Table 1 shows the projected 
percentage decrease in costs from delivering LNG to Oahu as compared to LS diesel.  
Table 1.   Savings in Delivered Energy Cost, LNG vs Low-Sulfur Diesel, 




It should be noted that these projected savings are contingent upon LNG’s being 
sourced from the continental United States, with Jones-Act compliant or -exempt ships 
available to transport the fuel (FGE, 2012). Savings are less than half if the LNG is 
sourced from Canada.  
LNG is less expensive than LS diesel and more environmentally friendly than oil 
or coal (EPA, 2014). Table 2 illustrates that LNG combustion produces less carbon 
dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxide than either oil or coal.  
Table 2.   By Products of Fuel Combustion (from EPA, 2000)  
     
 
Experts disagree as to whether the findings in Table 2 translate directly to a 
potential national reduction in carbon emissions. Research conducted by the University of 
California, Irvine; Stanford University; and the nonprofit organization Near Zero have 
released findings indicating that increased LNG use would have an insignificant benefit 
on the environment, as compared to coal (Nunez, 2014). The report found “between 2013 
and 2055 the use of natural gas could reduce cumulative emissions from the electricity 
sector by no more than 9 percent” (Nunez, 2014). Their research concluded that LNG is 
not a suitable bridge fuel from coal to renewable energy from an environmental 
perspective. 
HECO commissioned the firm of Galway Energy Advisors LLC to study the 
commercial viability of importing LNG to Oahu. Completed in October 2012 (Galway, 
2013), the Galway report stated that importing LNG would be economically beneficial, 
that Pearl Harbor would be the most economically viable location for an LNG terminal 
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(Galway, 2013), and that HECO could use the same diesel power-generation 
infrastructure, with minor upgrades (Galway, 2013).  
5. Energy Storage 
HECO announced in a May 2014 press release that it is pursuing investments in a 
storage technology that will accommodate 60–200 MW of energy for up to thirty minutes 
(Wall Street Journal, 2014). HECO’s request for proposal (RFP No. 072114-01) observes 
that  
rapid growth in variable renewable energy penetration to the electrical grid 
has become a challenge to manage. The intermittent nature of wind and 
solar generation require that the existing thermal generation fleet since it 
needs to manage the volatility of the variable generation. Voltage and 
frequency regulation on the grid are expected to become increasingly 
challenging with progressively higher levels of variable renewable 
generation. (Wall Street Journal, 2014)  
In September 2014, Pacific Business News reported that HECO was negotiating 
with three energy-storage developers after receiving 60 proposals (Shimogawa, 2014). 
“Colton Ching, vice president for energy delivery for HECO... [stated that] all three are 
proposing battery storage. We hope to sign contracts with all three that offer the best 
value for Oahu electric customers” (Shimogawa, 2014). 
Energy storage could be extremely useful in protecting the grid from power 
fluctuations. Utility-scale energy storage could also be designed to back up critical 
infrastructure in the event of complete power loss. 
6. Renewable Energy Reimbursement 
The State of Hawaii has a net-metering initiative that allows customers to pay 
solely for electricity utilized minus the amount of energy the customer produced via 
renewable energy (Energy.gov, 2014). However, net metering is restricted to a less-than 
100-kW capacity for individual systems in Oahu. Several pilot programs have been 
instituted by the HECO utilities, as mandated by the PUC, to allow larger systems to 
qualify for net metering that is “technically and economically reasonable and practicable” 
(Energy.gov, 2014). However, the pilot program’s maximum capacity falls far short of 
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the 50-MW solar PV capacity that is proposed for Pearl Harbor Naval Base (Energy.gov, 
2014) (CNRH, 2014). 
Whether solar PV infrastructure is purchased by the Navy or an independent 
entity with whom the Navy negotiates a power-purchase agreement (PPA), the 50-MW 
system would be reimbursed by HECO at a rate of no less than the avoided energy costs. 
These costs range from 19 cents/kWh on peak demand to 15 cents/kWh in the off-peak, 
providing that the system is tied into the local utility grid (HECO, 2014a). An 
independent power producer (IPP) or the Navy could negotiate a rate exceeding the 
avoided energy costs if the agreement is signed no later than one year after the plant is 
brought online. The excerpts below outline the legal precedent for avoided energy costs, 
found in Docket No. 7310, Decision Order No. 24086, filed March 11, 2008. 
Our reading of [HAR chapter 6–74], the applicable state statute, and 
federal rules and regulations is that a utility and an independent power 
producer are not precluded from negotiating a contract that contains a 
front-end loaded energy rate and an environmental and security premium 
pricing structure. Both [Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”)] 269–27.2 and 
HAR 6–74-22 (a) (3) require only that rates from power purchases be not 
less than 100 per cent of the utility’s avoided energy cost and not less than 
the minimum purchase rate. Moreover, HAR 6–74-15 (b) (1) provides that 
nothing in subchapter 3 of [HAR Chapter 6–74] “prohibit [s] an electric 
utility or any qualifying facility to agree to a rate for any purchase, or 
terms or conditions relation to any purchase, which differ from the rate or 
terms or conditions which would otherwise be required by this subchapter. 
Although a qualifying facility and a utility may negotiate a contract 
containing [a] front-end loaded energy rate and avoided external cost 
pricing structure, any such contract must receive the commission’s 
approval if the utility is to recover any payments it makes under the 
contract from its ratepayers. In its review of such a contract, the 
commission must determine, among other things, whether the rate and 
pricing structure are just and reasonable and in the overall best interest of 
the general public. In making that determination, the appropriateness of a 
front-end loaded energy rate and pricing structure in the particular contract 
is a relevant consideration. (PUC, 2008) 
 HAR 6–74-1 defines “minimum purchase rate” in terms of utility’s 
avoided energy cost. In the case of a legally enforceable contract between 
a qualifying facility and the utility, the minimum purchase rate is the 
utility’s avoided energy cost in effect on the date the contract becomes 
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effective. Where there is no contract in excess of one year, the minimum 
purchase rate is the utility’s avoided energy cost in effect on the date the 
qualifying facility delivers energy to the utility.” (PUC, Footnote Nine, 
2008) 
The avoided energy costs (> 100kW). Schedule “Q” rates (< or = 100 kW) Q-rate 
(cents/kWh) on July 1, 2014 in Oahu. On-peak avoided energy cost was 19.701 (HECO, 
2014a). The off-peak avoided energy cost was 15.143, and the Schedule Q for systems 
less than 100 kW was 17.33 (HECO, 2014a). 
7. Legislation 
The Hawaii Clean-Energy Initiative was passed in January 2008 to create a 
roadmap from oil to renewable-energy power generation (Braccio, Finch, and Frazier, 
2012). “Hawaii Clean Energy Initiative set a goal of generating 70% of electricity from 
renewable sources by 2030; 40% from local generation and 30% from energy efficiency 
and conservation measures” (Megan Strand and Jake Seligaman, 2013). Residential, 
commercial, and utility-scale solar PV all play a part in reaching this goal.  
The DOD has strict guidelines regulating the transition to renewable energy. The 
“National Defense Authorization Act of 2010: Section 2842 requires the DOD to produce 
or procure 25 percent of its total facility energy use from renewable sources, beginning in 
2025” (Environmental and Energy Study Institute, 2011). Naval Base Pearl Harbor needs 
to procure 179,371 MWh per year by 2025 if energy consumption remains at FY 2013 
levels (B. Law, email to author, October 24, 2014). 
B. OBJECTIVE OF THIS STUDY 
This study analyzes the best information available and presents decision makers 
with recommendations as to which proposed energy projects offer the greatest benefit to 
the DOD and United States taxpayer. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• For CNRH, what is the NPV of a 50-MW solar PV installation? 
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• What is the leased value of the land for an LNG-import terminal 
(~.55mmpta)? 
• What is the difference in cost between using Pearl Harbor land and a 
floating LNG terminal? 
• If an LNG-import terminal were built, what percentage could the CNRH 
expect to save on its utility bill? 
• What impact would an LNG-import terminal have on independent 
renewable-energy power producers due to PUC-mandated avoided energy 
costs? 
D. SCOPE OF STUDY 
This study is limited to economic analysis of a 50-MW solar-PV project on the 
West Loch Peninsula and an LNG-import terminal, both on Pearl Harbor Naval Base, 
from the perspective of CNRH. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY 
 This thesis contains six chapters. Chapter I includes the background, objective, 
research questions, and scope of investigation. Chapter II presents a review of relevant 
documents. Chapter III describes the methodological approach,  NPV, and years to break 
even for solar PV. Chapter IV analyzes findings, beginning with an introduction, basic 
assumptions, and data and sensitivity analyses and concluding with a note on the study’s 
limitations. Chapter V provides an economic analysis of the LNG-import terminal. 
Chapter VI summarizes findings and gives recommendations. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. “TRACKING THE SUN VII” 
 “Tracking the Sun” is a report funded by the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory and the U.S. Department of Energy to examine data on installed solar PV in 
the United States (Barbose, Weaver, and Darghouth, 2014). The study synthesizes data 
from approximately 300,000 individual residential solar, commercial, and utility-scale 
PV systems, which represents 80% of the installed solar capacity in the United States 
(Barbose et al., 2014). The intent of the study was to track the installed costs of solar PV 
before tax incentives. The report separates the costs among residential, commercial, and 
utility systems. This thesis concerns trends in utility-scale PVs only.  
The report found that “capacity-weighted average installed prices fell by 40%, 
from $5.0/W for the 5 systems [utility-scale solar-PV projects] installed during the 2007–
2009 period to $3.0/W for the 25 systems completed in 2013” (Barbose et al., 2014). 
However, there was negligible price reduction in the 25 utility-scale projects completed 
in 2013 when compared with utility projects completed in 2012 (Barbose et al., 2014). 
Possible explanations for this cost flattening include the use of increased premium 
efficiency modules and solar-PV unit-tracking capabilities (Barbose et al., 2014).  
The report documented a significant decrease in the cost of crystalline silicon (c-
Si) modules as compared to thin-film modules (Barbose et al., 2014). “Average installed 
prices [of crystalline silicon] fell by $3.4/W (52%) between the 2007–2009 period and 
2013;” however, thin-film prices remained virtually the same during that period (Barbose 
et al., 2014).  
Prices of the 25 utility-scale solar projects completed in America in 2013 varied 
considerably, ranging from $1.9/W to $4.9W, with most of the projects ranging from 
$2.6/W to $3.5/W (Barbose et al., 2014). The capacity-weighted average-installed-price 
for c-Si modules and tracking was $3.1/W and $3.0/W for fixed- tilt (Barbose et al., 
2014). Thin-film systems cost less, at $2.7/W for fixed-tilt (Barbose et al., 2014).  
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The study found that larger systems did not reflect cost savings due to economies 
of scale (Barbose et al., 2014). Additionally, the costs for systems completed in 2012 and 
2013 that were greater than 50 MW had a cost per Watt between a narrow range of $2.6/
W to $3.2/W (Barbose et al., 2014).  
B. HAWAII SOLAR INTEGRATION STUDY 
The Hawaii Solar Integration Study was commissioned by HECO in response to 
the Hawaii Clean-Energy Initiative (HSIS, 2012). A research team analyzed numerous 
scenarios with various amounts of solar and wind generation (HSIS, 2012). 
The study found that the Oahu grid could accommodate up to 20% renewable 
energy before point grid security began to be compromised (HSIS, 2012). The study 
stated that integrating renewable energy into the grid would reduce variable costs by 19% 
each year, relative to the baseline system (HSIS, 2012). However, the estimated reduction 
in costs did not account for the capital required to integrate wind and solar energy into the 
grid (HSIS, 2012) and also failed to include the cost of the PPA and mitigation measures 
(HSIS, 2012). 
The study analyzed technologies that would mitigate large fluctuations in current, 
including the battery energy-storage system (BESS) (HSIS, 2012). The study determined 
that a “BESS of approximately 24–30 MW was needed at each of the [central PV plants 
greater than] 100 MW” to “provide a 5% pu/min ramp rate functionality” (HSIS, 2012). 
The energy rating for the BESS would need to be between 16–18 min (HSIS, 2012). If 
the ramp rate could be reduced, the operating reserves on the system could also be 
reduced (HSIS, 2012). If the rate were reduced from 5% pu/min to an aggressive .8% pu/
min, the spinning reserves would be reduced by approximately 40 MW, a reduction of 
17% (HSIS, 2012). These calculations were made with the assumption that the annual 
energy demand for the Oahu system is 8,084 GWhr, with a system peak of 1,263MW 
(HSIS, 2012).  
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C. THE GALWAY REPORT 
The Galway report was commissioned by HECO to investigate feasible options 
for establishing an LNG-import terminal in Hawaii. The report found that LNG suppliers 
factored in the risk of physical damage to a ship when quoting LNG delivery costs 
(Galaway, 2013). The premium charged for this risk was approximately $1 per MMtu, or 
approximately 25% more in shipping and regasification costs (Galway, 2013). Table 3 
shows that delivered LNG costs are significantly higher with an offshore buoy 
configuration (highlighted in green) as compared to dockside configurations (Galway, 
2013).  












The following points from the Galway study summarize its salient concepts:  
Supply risk is not anticipated to be an issue for HECO due to growing 
liquefaction capacity but managing price risk could be a key issue. 
There are three procurement options: 
1.  Buy long-term supplies from a traditional supplier at oil 
indexation. 
2. Buy from the spot market. 
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3. Contract for U.S. liquefaction tolling capacity (and buy gas from 
U.S. grid) 
HECO’s demand for LNG is small, which may limit its negotiation 
leverage as well as procurement options 
 
Near shore floating LNG terminal options are viable but may face 
significant permitting challenges. 
 
Although offshore floating options could be viable, additional study is 
required to confirm this. 
 
Shipping strategy is driven by supply strategy and regasification 
configuration. U.S. Sourced supplies are likely to necessitate HECO’s 
entry into the shipping business due to the Jones Act compliance 
requirements. 
 
There appears to be a significant positive burner tip price spread between 
HECO’s [Low Sulfur Fuel Oil] LSFO/ [Low Sulfur Diesel] LSD and U.S. 
LNG costs. There may be a positive price spread against global oil 
indexed LNG prices as well. 
 
Galway believe there to be sufficient viability to further investigate LNG 
as an alternative fuel 
 
Galway recommends that the next step should be to further define project 
scope and confirm technical and regulatory viability. This can be 
accomplished by undertaking the following tasks: 
 
Commission detailed siting studies to assess the viability of offshore buoy 
based options. This could take 3 to 6 months with costs ranging from $0.5 
to $1 million. 
 
HECO should initiate discussions with the U.S. Navy to assess the 
viability of locating a FSRU based terminal in Pearl Harbor. 
 
Develop regulatory and permitting strategy through informal consultations 
with federal and state regulatory authorities.  
 
Develop detailed commercial and business structure for LNG importation. 
 
Hold informal consultations with vendors and suppliers. (Galway, 2013) 
Another major consideration in establishing an LNG-import terminal is the 
longevity of the terminal. The Galway study estimates import scenarios of .85, .65, and 
.525 millions of tons per annum (mmtpa) for the first ten years and .55, .4, and .275 
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mmtpa for the following ten (Galway, 2013). In essence, the Galway study forecasts a 
reduction in LNG volumes of 35%, 38%, and 47%, respectively in the first ten years of 
production (Galway, 2013). Therefore, the Navy must carefully examine long-term plans 
for the import terminal and commission a disposal-cost study before committing to a 
contract. 
An additional factor that must be considered is whether to build the LNG-import 
terminal onshore or afloat. (Either approach must accommodate regasification, or re-gas, 
the process of converting liquefied natural gas to natural gas at atmospheric temperature.) 
The Galway report summarizes the two options as shown in Table 4 (Galway, 2013). 




Capital costs may vary from $0.5–$1.5 billion based on the size and configuration 
of structures used in high-volume situations (Galway, 2013). Economies of scale are 
essential in onshore regasification terminals for companies to recoup the costs of service, 
debt servicing, and taxes (Galway, 2013). HECO is not likely to benefit unless significant 
economies of scale from an onshore gas facility can be achieved (Galway, 2013).  
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Floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) may result in significantly less 
expensive upfront costs and may prove more cost effective in situations with low 
economies of scale (Galway, 2013). Additionally, floating solutions are easier to 
implement, both in construction costs and permitting (Galway, 2013). Onshore 
regasification permits issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission can take 
three to four years (Galway, 2013). The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for permitting 
offshore terminals and has streamlined the process to less than a year (Galway, 2013).  
For berth-based floating terminal solutions, “Kalaeloa Harbor and Pearl Harbor 
may be the only viable sites” (Galway, 2013). Kalaeloa Harbor is well protected, with 
relatively deep water (38 feet), and is close to HECO’s plants and the hub of the fuel-
pipeline distribution infrastructure (Galway, 2013), though the distribution infrastructure 
may need to be expanded to accommodate more gas (Galway, 2013). “Met-ocean 
conditions are a key determinant of the feasibility of floating LNG solutions” (Galway, 
2013). Further study is needed to determine whether Kalaeloa Harbor conditions are 
sufficiently mild (Galway, 2013). “From a functional perspective, [Pearl Harbor] is likely 
to be the best site as it is protected, in calm waters and closer to major power and gas load 
customer” (Galway, 2013). 
Floating options using ship-to-ship (STS) transfers may not be feasible in Hawaii 
because of the turgid sea state. Unlike U.S. Navy ships, LNG ships conducting STS 
transfers do not typically transfer gas while underway (moving through the water). STS 
occur mainly between two ships physically fastened via mooring lines. In 2013, FSRU 
STS transfers were conducted while docked 95% of the time (Galway, 2013).  
Offshore Hawaii has unfavorable sea conditions for STS transfers (Galway, 
2013). The report states that a historical analysis of the sea state off the coast of Hawaii in 
the vicinity of Barber’s Point showed sea conditions as satisfactory only 14% of the year, 
due primarily to the periodicity of the sea state’s exceeding 8 seconds (Galway, 2013). 
Galway determined that STS “seems unlikely to be feasible” (Galway, 2013).  
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Kalaeloa Harbor and offshore Barbers Point are two locations under consideration 
for an LNG-import facility (Galway, 2013). Table 5 shows both feasible and unfeasible 
options. 
Table 5.  Summary of Options for Regasification Infrastructure (after 
Galway, 2013) 
While several of the options in Table 5 are feasible pending further siting 
considerations, Pearl Harbor is presently considered the best option (Galway, 2013). The 
Galway report wrote states, 
Pearl Harbor seems to be the best site for a Hawaii LNG terminal. The site 
is protected is in calm water and would likely require little dredging. 
Further, it is close to major load centers for power HECO and local gas 
companies. Presumably, it could also provide ancillary benefits to the U.S. 
Navy Base (Galway, 2013). 
The Galway report notes that “Kalaeloa Harbor is seen as a viable fallback siting 
option, but obtaining the required permits and approval will require stakeholder consent 
and input” (Galway, 2013). The major problems with Kalaeloa Harbor are: 
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• Berth availability “Kalaeloa Harbor is a busy commercial port with
limited berth availability.” The Hawaii Department of Transportation,
Harbor Division, must be consulted with regard to terminal expansions
(Galway, 2013).
• Harbor dredging “Dredging would be required to accommodate standard
LNG ships and berthed FSRUs” (Galway, 2013). The estimated dredging
cost would range from $5 million to $10 million. Additionally, land-based
excavation would also be required, with an estimated cost between $6
million to $20 million at one potential location in Kalaeloa Harbor
(Galway, 2013). Removal of dirt also requires an environmental impact
study under the NEPA process administered by the FERC permitting
process, which increases time and expense (Galway, 2013). However,
dredging would be minimized or eliminated with a small or midscale LNG
solution either onshore or floating (Galway, 2013).
• Security zones The Coast Guard mandates the placement of security
zones on a site-by-site basis for LNG vessels both underway and moored
(Galway, 2013). Merchant traffic and pleasure boaters may have
substantial opposition to LNG permitting in Kalaeloa Harbor (Galway,
2013). Additionally, residential homes would likely fall within an
exclusion zone, which are “determined through modeling and are
dependent on site specific characteristics such as prevailing temperatures,
humidity, wind speed and direction, topography” (Galway, 2013).
D. FACTS OF GLOBAL ENERGY 
FGE was contracted in 2012 to conduct an analysis of the LNG market for 
Hawaii. The study primarily focused on market conditions for LNG and sourcing 
possibilities and financial benefits of building an LNG-import terminal (FGE, 2012).  
Obtaining LNG from the right supplier is a primary driver behind the economics of an 
LNG-import terminal on Hawaii. One advantage Hawaii has in sourcing fuel from one of 
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the new American LNG-export terminals is that the import terminal would be exempted 
from DOE approval because the shipment would be considered interstate trade rather 
than legal exporting (FGE, 2012). However, since the trade would be interstate, the Jones 
Act would apply (FGE, 2012), requiring “trade between two U.S. ports to be carried on 
U.S.-built, U.S.-flagged ships, and the crew must be three-quarters comprised of U.S. 
merchant seaman” (FGE, 2012). Currently, all LNG ships built in the United States are 
flagged abroad (FGE, 2013). Therefore, American ships would have to be purchased new 
or reflagged (FGE, 2012).   
An additional problem stems from the fact that all LNG ships, even the smallest, 
are rated at a capacity of 57,000 tonnes of LNG at 90% of their deadweight tonnage 
(DWT, the total weight of cargo that a ship can transport) (FGE, 2012) (FGE, 2012). For 
security of supply, at least two of these ships would have to be engaged (FGE, 2012). The 
pair of hypothetical ships would supply 2.2 million tons of LNG per year, or a million 
tons if traversing from Australia to the Gulf Coast (FGE, 2012). The Galway study 
expects .85 million tons per annum on the high side and, on the low end, .525 tons per 
year (Galway, 2013). Additionally, the demand is expected to decrease 35%–47% by the 
eleventh year (Galway, 2013).  
American LNG ships were all built prior to 1980, making replacement a 
consideration (FGE, 2012). However, it is widely held that the industrial infrastructure 
for building an LNG cargo ship to replace aging ships no longer exists in the United 
States (FGE, 2012). One possible substitute is LNG barges that have been built outside 
the U.S. (FGE, 2012). The Coast Guard has deemed foreign LNG barges Jones-Act 
exempt, providing that “the LNG containment vessels are not an integral part of the hull” 
(FGE, 2012). Further investigation is required to determine whether an FSRU could 
receive a Jones-Act waiver (FGE, 2012).  
Table 6 shows shipping costs from several LNG-import terminals and highlights 
how these costs can vary by large percentages, depending on where the LNG is sourced. 
The importance of shipping strategy in the overall economic analysis of the LNG-import 
terminal is also suggested.  
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Table 6.   LNG Tanker Shipping Costs (from FGE, 2012) 
According to the FGE report, 
Offshore storage and gasification along the model of the single tending 
line (STL) buoy system may in fact be a poor idea for Hawaii, irrespective 
of delivery economics. Once the LNG gas reassumes a gaseous form, 
many options become impractical. Yes, gas onshore on Oahu can feed 
power plants and existing Hawaii Gas SNG customers, but it eliminates 
many of the other possible usages of LNG such as road transport and 
marine bunkering. LNG may also be the best way to deliver gas for CNG 
filling stations (FGE, 2013). 
The cost of converting diesel plants to LNG must be carefully considered (FGE, 
2013). Plants in Puerto Rico have been retrofitted as dual-firing plants that burn either 
LNG or diesel at any given time (FGE, 2012). Technology vendors consulted in the FGE 
study indicate that the cost of fitting a new power plant for dual firing would cost 
$500,000 per unit, and the cost of retrofitting an existing plant would be nearly $1 million 
(FGE, 2012). The main consideration is the cost per kWh. For a plant like Kahe, which 
has six units, the retrofit would cost approximately $6 million (FGE, 2012). If the plan 
maintains a 60% utilization rate, the cost per kWh for retrofitting to dual firing is less 
than 0.02 cents (FGE, 2012). The FGE study further concluded that the retrofitting cost 
per kWh could be higher in lower-capacity, less-utilized plants, but was not likely to 
exceed 0.1 cents/kWh. Therefore, the cost of retrofitting a plant is negligible compared to 
fuel, shipping, and capital-investment costs. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH APPROACH
A. INTRODUCTION 
Many variables and models must be considered when analyzing multi-million-
dollar energy projects. Assumptions for developing the NPV and CBA are clarified in 
this chapter, followed by explanations of calculations and formulas for each model.  
B. PEARL HARBOR SOLAR-PV ANALYSIS 
The NPV for Solar PV has been calculated over a 30-year timeframe with a 
scheduled system upgrade of $20 million ($400/installed kW) at year fifteen and an 
additional upgrade of $12.5 million ($250/ installed kW) at year seventeen to address any 
degradation in panels, wiring, or invertor performance. These assumptions are best 
estimates; however, a higher fidelity model can be employed based on inputs from the 
actual performance and miscellaneous costs of the solar-PV system at Waipu, once 
installed (CNRH, 2014). The net-present-value method compares the benefits of owning 
a solar-PV system and the option of a PPA, while considering the time value of money.  
Table 7.  Solar PV NPV Assumptions 
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1. 50-MW Solar-NPV Assumptions at West Loch 
The assumptions in Table 8 have been used to develop the 50-MW solar-PV NPV 
(see Appendix A) and evaluate the best course of action for CNRH. The assumptions 
were generated from the information provided by CNRH and the most relevant published 
data. The system capacity was selected by CNRH (CNRH, 2014b). While 50 MW was 
used for the base-case assumption, system capacity may change before contract 
finalization.  
An efficiency and usage percentage of 22% was obtained from a local report 
commissioned by HECO for various amounts of solar efficiency per location on Oahu 
(HSIS, 2012). The stated 22% for efficiency (usage) is specific to the Pearl Harbor area 
and is considered a high-fidelity estimate (HSIS, 2012).  
The $0.28/kWh was obtained directly from CNRH (CNRH, 2013). CNRH paid 
HECO/KIUC $0.272/kWh on average in FY2013 for all electricity used within the 
NAFAC regional fence line (B. Law, email to author, October 24, 2014). Therefore, $.28/ 
kWh reflects a conservative estimate for the CNRH utility rate, which has shown a strong 
historical trend of increasing.  
A 2% annual electricity price increase was used as an estimate that roughly 
mirrors expected inflation and the average annual PPA rate increase for Hawaii 
(Solsystems, 2014).  
The 50MW system cost was determined by multiplying the capacity of the system 
(50,000 kW =50MW) by the expected $3.10W(dc) for an upper estimate of the utility-
scale projects in Hawaii (Solsystems, 2014). This amount is corroborated by a recent Sun 
Shot report observing that U.S. solar prices for a utility-scale c-Si fixed-tilt in 2013–2014 
averaged $3.0 W (dc) (Barbose, Galen, Weaver, and Darghouth, 2014). Therefore, $3100 
kW (dc) or $3.10 W (dc) was used for the base-case assumption. 
Systems maintenance costs were assessed at $40/kW-year with an increase in 
costs of 2% per year, totaling $2 million for the first year. $40/kW-year was generated 
from an EPRI report that asserted total O&M costs as $47 /kW-yr (EPRI, 2010). Table 8 
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shows the costs of ground-mounted, fixed-tilt solar panels made of monocrystalline (c-Si) 
panels (EPRI, 2010). The price breakdown is as follows: 




The O&M cost estimates seem extremely conservative. Costs such as scheduled 
maintenance/cleaning, unscheduled maintenance, and inverter-replacement reserve 
certainly apply to the West Loch solar PV project; however, costs such as insurance and 
property taxes do not, if the Navy chooses to purchase the system and not pursue a PPA. 
Accordingly, only $8 ($/kWh) of the insurance, property taxes, and owners’s costs were 
allocated to the total O&M costs. Therefore, the working number for analysis is 40 rather 
than 47 ($/kWh-yr). 
Degradation of system capability was also considered. According to a report 
entitled “Outdoor PV Degradation Comparison” by Jordan, Smith, Gelak, Kurtz, and 
Osterwald, the median degradation of solar PV panels over time was 0.5% per year after 
comparing 40 different modules from ten different manufactures with a minimum 
degradation assessment time of two years (2010). All the panels assessed were installed 
before 2008, and several before 2000 (Jordan, Smith, Gelak, Kurtz, and Oserwarld, 
2010). In their findings, the authors report that panels produced after 2000 show 
considerably less degradation than panels produced before (Jordan, Smith, Gelak, Kurtz, 
and Oserwarld, 2010). Since older panels were included in the population sample that 
resulted in a 0.5% median degradation, 0.5% appeared to be a fairly conservative 
estimate, taking into consideration the age of the solar-PV technology, recent 
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advancements in PV technology, and the ability to choose panels that demonstrate lower 
degradation.   
2. Solar Methodology 
Solar PV was evaluated in two ways. The first way was to determine the NPV 
over 30 years. The second way was to determine the number of years for the investment 
to break even.  
a. NPV of Solar PV over Different Investment Costs 
The cost of solar PV is not a fixed price. While indications are that utility-scale 
solar prices bottomed out in 2012 and 2013, each individual project is different (Barbose, 
Galen, Weaver, and Darghouth, 2014). Therefore, a particular emphasis was made to 
evaluate the NPV over a range of installed costs in 2013 dollars, from $2.70 to $3.70 per 
Watt (dc) (Barbose, Galen, Weaver, and Darghouth, 2014). Analysis over a broad range 
of installed costs allows more relevant estimation of pricing predictions.  
b. Break-Even Analysis 
A break-even analysis was conducted to estimate the first year solar PV would 
have a positive NPV. The values were discounted at the OMB real discount rate of 1.9% 
for projects with a life cycle of 30 years. 
3. Solar PV Sensitivity Analysis 
Solar-PV sensitivity analysis was conducted for both changes in cost savings and 
efficiency or performance over time. The cost savings were evaluated at three values: 
$0.28/ kWh, $0.19/ kWh, and $13.3/ kWh. $0.28/kWh was used under the assumption 
that either a net-metering situation would exist or a micro-grid could be installed to 
completely avoid the utility-rate costs. This situation is unlikely to occur, since the PUC 
allows for net metering on less than 100-kW systems only (HECO, 2014a). Therefore, 
utility-scale systems such as the proposed project at West Loch would not qualify for net 
metering. Additionally, CNRH contributes 6.5% of gross revenue for Hawaii Electric 
Industries (HEI) and all of HEI’s subsidiaries, according to the 2013 consolidated 10-K 
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(B. Law, email to author, October 24, 2014) (HECO, 2014b). It is highly unlikely that 
HECO could sustain such large losses in revenue, considering the relatively small 
margins authorized by the PUC.  
Utility-scale projects must be repaid at a rate of no less than 100% of the utility 
avoided energy cost, which was $0.19/kWh for 7/1/2014 (HAR 6–74-22) (HECO, 
2014a). Therefore, the second rate analyzed was $0.19/kWh to capture minimum avoided 
energy costs that would be paid by HECO to a utility-scale IPP.  
The final rate analyzed was $0.133/kWh, because it captured the savings that 
HECO predicted might be expected if an LNG-import terminal were installed. HECO 
reported to CNRH that an LNG-import terminal would result in a 20%–30% reduction in 
utility rates (CNRH, 2014b), as in the equation below.  $0.19
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘ℎ
∗ (1− 30%) = $0.133
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘ℎ
 
Three different efficiencies were chosen for sensitivity analysis. The base case 
chosen was 22% in accordance with the HECO-commissioned HSIS report. Additionally, 
efficiencies of 18% and 28% were analyzed, based on the approximated minus- and plus-
two cents in the levelized cost of energy (LCOE), respectively.  
C. A POTENTIAL LNG TERMINAL 
An LNG-import terminal could be a significant benefit to CNRH and all utility 
ratepayers. While many locations might work for an LNG terminal, the Pearl Harbor 
terminal was cited as the best location by the FGE and Galway reports (FGE, 2012) 
(Galway, 2013). Both reports cited the offshore terminals as likely unfeasible or requiring 
further investigation, due to technical difficulties involving sea state (FGE, 2012) 
(Galway, 2013). Besides Pearl Harbor, the only other onshore LNG terminal possible is 
Kalaeloa Harbor, the main commercial port for Oahu.  
1. Zone of Possible Agreement  
A zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) is the bargaining range in which two 
parties are willing to conduct business (Spangler, 2013), based on the concept that both 
 29 
parties have already established their best alternative to a negotiated agreement 
(BATNA), or best alternative option (Rogers and Ury, 2011). Figure 6 depicts how a 
ZOPA can be used. 
 
Figure 6.  ZOPA (from Spangler, 2013) 
This figure may also describe real negotiations with fictitious numbers. Assume 
CNRH is the seller and HECO the buyer, though HECO is currently pursuing CNRH to 
reach an agreement. According to Figure 6, the seller (CNRH) is not willing to lease the 
land for less than a fictitious $4,500, because the land could be leased to an outside entity 
for no less than $4,500. Therefore, CNRH’s BATNA is $4,500. The buyer (HECO) is not 
willing to lease the land for greater than $5,000 because that is the cost of a lease at 
Kalaeloa Harbor, which would have equal operating costs. Thus, HECO’s BATNA is no 
greater than $5,000. 
2. Galway Report LNG NPV 
The LNG NPV is conducted from the prospective of HECO. While it is 
impossible to account for all of the factors that would contribute to the costs of an LNG-
import terminal, the LNG NPV is extremely useful in understanding HECO’s willingness 
to pay for the LNG land lease at Pearl Harbor. The FGE report cites the expected cost to 
retrofit a diesel generator so that it can also be used with LNG (FGE, 2012). The FGE 
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report also provides estimates for the cost of the piping infrastructure required to 
transport LNG from an import terminal to the HECO power facilities (FGE, 2012).  
The Galway report gives estimates for the commodity and transportation costs to 
Oahu of several of the most viable options and provides a range of costs for a floating 
storage re-gas unit (FSRU)—plus the infrastructure required to safely moor the unit in the 
harbor. 
Based on the numbers generated from the FGE and Galway reports, an NPV 
could be conducted with the assumptions listed in Table 9. 
Table 9.   Galway LNG NPV Assumptions 
 
 
The consumption of LNG was derived from the Galway report, in which 0.65 
mpta was the midpoint value of three estimates in the “HECO Re-gas Economic 
Analysis” (Galway, 2013). Additionally, the model is centered at 0.55 mpta, which is the 
figure HECO communicated to CNRH as the approximate capacity of the LNG terminal 
(CNRH, 2014b). The Galway model demonstrated a decreasing consumption of LNG 
from 0.65 mpta a year in 2020 to 0.40 mpta a year in 2030 (Galway, 2013).  
The reduction in LNG consumption would be consistent with HECO’s 
commitment to achieving the Hawaii Clean Energy Initiative mandate of 40% renewable 
energy by 2030. Therefore, this report modeled a linear reduction in LNG consumption in 
Year 1 (2021) 0.65 mpta to Year 10 (2030) 0.40 mpta. 
The base-case acquisition and transportation costs of LNG were obtained from the 
FGE report entitled “USWC Delivery Build-Up, 2012 $/mmBtu (Tanker Delivery),” 
which is summarized for this report in Table 10 (FGE, 2012). USWC refers to the United 
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States west coast, where LNG will likely be exported from terminals such as Jordan Cove 
(FGE, 2012).  
Table 10.   Cost of Delivered LNG in $/mmBTU (after FGE,2012) 
 
 
Table 11.   Comparison in Delivered Cost of LNG to LSFO and LS Diesel 
(after FGE, 2012) 
 
 
The onshore cost of $2.38 by the FGE group amounts to $79 million a year at 
0.65 mtpa and $50 million a year at 0.40 mpta. These costs are consistent with this 




Table 12.   Moored LNG FSRU Costs 
 
 
The $404 million amortized over ten years with an interest rate of 7.33% equates 
to $57 million annually (Stock Researching, 2014). HECO is unlikely to finance the 
project itself, due to lack of expertise and an extremely high cost of capital stemming 
from its BBB- credit rating (Hawaii Electric Industries, Inc., 2014).  
The 7.33% interest rate in Table 12 is obtained from the weighted average cost of 
capital of Royal Dutch Shell, which could serve as a possible consortium for the 
investment, having both technical expertise and a credit rating significantly higher than 
HECO’s (Stock Researching, 2014). The rate of 7.33% is more applicable than the 
interest rate for financing that Shell could obtain, because Shell would need to generate 
an ROI that would satisfy shareholders. These factors are considered in the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) (Stock Researching, 2014).  
The “revenue” in the NPV was assessed in avoided fuel costs or the difference 
from the forecasted LS diesel price and the forecasted LNG delivered-to-the-power-plant 
cost. The forecast for LS diesel by FGE from year 2020–2030 is seen as more 
conservative than EIA estimates, because rises in prices vary little over the decade (FGE, 
2012). The forecast for LNG prices is also based on the Henry Hub system, which 
considers the additional provisions listed in Table 12.  
The added transportation cost allows LNG to be compared to LS diesel, which 
can be procured on Oahu from oil refineries without significant transportation costs or 
physical losses. Additionally, sunk costs in LS-diesel infrastructure are not included. The 
2% inflation rate was used to discount the cash-flow differential between LS diesel and 
LNG costs only. The forecasted price of LS diesel and LNG accounted for inflation; 
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therefore, the 2% increase was not applied. The cumulative analysis of the NPV will 
serve as a metric to determine the upper boundary of HECO’s willingness to pay. That 
upper boundary can be used as the key upper limit in the ZOPA model for determining a 
fair land lease.  
3. Economics of Pearl Harbor LNG Terminal Alternatives 
The Galway report states in its conclusion that “Pearl Harbor is the best choice” 
for a regasification terminal of all sites evaluated (Galway, 2013). The “next best option 
would be an offshore floating option with shuttling FSRUs, but additional study is 
required to confirm” (Galway, 2013). The third option is a “near-shore floating option at 
Kalaeloa Harbor” (Galway, 2013). However, the Kalaeloa Harbor viability is dependent 
upon “permitting challenges” and “stakeholder issues” being satisfactorily overcome 
(Galway, 2013). 
This section evaluates the economic benefits of one re-gas option over another and 
analyzes the re-gas and transportation costs for different type of facilities, over different 
LNG volumes, without considering commodity cost. Table 13 employs values from the 
Galway report and Table 14 transforms the $/mmBtu units from Table 13 into total costs. 
The conversion rate used was 49,257,899.069 mmBtu = 1 mpta. The total costs were 











Table 13.  Re-gas and Shipping Economics (after Galway, 2013) 
Table 14.  LNG Commodity Prices Generated after Galway Report 
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4. Comparable LNG-Terminal Land Leases 
The methodology used in estimating the fair value of the Pearl Harbor land lease 
was to find comparable LNG-terminal land leases and determine what they are paying. 
Table 30 provides the basis for a multivariable-regression analysis based on the specified 
parameter in tables 15 and 16. 
Table 15.   Comparable LNG-Terminal Land Leases  
 
Table 16.   LNG Land-Lease Metrics 
 
 
5. LNG Expected Electricity Savings 
HECO has communicated to CNRH that the expected savings in utility prices of 
an LNG-import terminal would range between 20%–30% (CNRH, 2014). Using 
publically available information, the Galway report attempted to verify those 
calculations. The HSIS report states that the Hawaii Integration Study Team “found that 
the Oahu grid could absorb all the available solar and wind energy” (904 GWh or 11% of 
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the annual load energy) (HSIS, 2012). By interpolation, it can reasonably be estimated 
that the annual demand for Oahu in 2011 was 8,218 GWh. 8,218 GWh is equivalent to 
28,040,979 mmBtu. The proposed annual import quantity of LNG ranges from 0.55–0.65 
mtpa of LNG and is equivalent of 28,040,979 mmBtu and 32,017,634 mmBtu of LNG, 
respectively. Therefore, we can reasonably conclude that HECO intends to replace all LS 
diesel use with LNG.  
The following tables were used to verify that anticipated reductions in utility costs 
are feasible. The values in Table 17 were obtained directly from HECO’s 2013 annual 
financial report to the PUC and were used to calculate the percentage of consumed fuel in 
overall operating and maintenance expenses, as well as total operating expenses. The 
values are found in the bottom-right side of the table. Table 18 evaluates HECO’s claim 
that LNG could reduce CNRH utility prices by 20%–30%. The first step is to use the total 
cost of fuel consumed in 2013 and reduce it by 25%–50%, a range consistent with both 
the FGE and Galway report findings. The Galway report states that the cost difference 
between delivered prices of LS fuel oil and LNG amounts to 42% (see page N-84, 
scenario 3B), which is the greatest estimated cost savings (Galway, 2013). FGE report 
makes similar findings, stating that “savings compared to LSFO range from 27%–42%; 
compared to diesel, LNG saves 39%–46%” (FGE, 2012). Therefore, a reduction in fuel 
costs of 25%-50% is used as a basis for evaluation. Two comparisons were made using 
operating and maintenance expenses and total operating costs as the denominator. The 
numerator was obtained from projected savings using LNG. The output from the 
calculation was turned into a percentage, as seen in tables 17 and 18. The explanation is 










Table 17.   HECO’s 2013 Annual Financial Report 
 
 
Table 18.   Percent Reduction in Operating Expenses from LNG Usage 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS OF SOLAR PV 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This project calculates the potential savings of two potential projects: a 50-MW 
solar-PV field and an approximately 0.55-mtpa LNG-import terminal. The solar-PV 
system is considered from a Navy-owned perspective only, since the calculations for a 
PPA are fairly simple once a contract is available.  
B. BASE-CASE ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
The real discount rate used in this research project is 1.0%, 1.6%, and 1.9%, for 
ten, 20, and 30 years, respectively, according to the OMB Circular A-94, as revised in 
December 2013 for calendar year 2014 (OMB, 2013). 
C. NPV OF SOLAR PV OVER DIFFERENT INVESTMENT COSTS 
The NPV of solar PV is an extremely helpful datum in deciding among projects. 
Figure 7 displays how the NPV changes based on different payback rates—the rates used 
in this analysis are $0.28kWh/ $0.19kWh/ $0.133kWh. The three lines represent the three 
most likely payback rates for electricity generated by solar-PV panels over a range of 
costs per panel, which excludes the costs of tying the panels into the grid (see Appendix 
A for NPV calculations). Figure 7 is useful in evaluating the benefits of ownership versus 
entering a power-purchase agreement and highlights the advantages of different payback-
rate scenarios. Finally, this figure helps evaluate the dollar amount available for 




Figure 7.  NPV of 50MW Solar PV 
Table 19 highlights the benefits of replacing energy for which HECO currently 
charges $0.28/kWh with renewable energy that costs $0.088/kWh (grid-tie in costs not 
included). Residential and commercial systems smaller than 100 kW are able to take 
advantage of net metering (Energy.gov, 2014); however, utility-scale systems (>2 MW) 
do not qualify. CNRH has special legal status as a federal entity to avoid certain aspects 
of state legislation; therefore, CNRH could legally pursue a micro-grid with utility-scale 
electrical-storage capacity supplied by 100% renewable energy. However, such efforts 
are unlikely to be well received by the Navy in their effort to privatize existing naval 
utility infrastructure or by Hawaiians who would pay significantly higher utility rates due 
to lost economies of scale. 
Table 19.   NPV of 50 MW Solar PV at $3.10 W(dc) 
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Appendix A displays calculation of the NPV on a 30-year timeframe with two 
scheduled refurbishments conducted at years fifteen and seventeen. The refurbishments 
are a component of the original cost and reflected as consistent over each scenario.  
D. SOLAR-PV BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS 
The solar-PV payback is relatively short and varies depending on payback rate. 
The payback period is six, nine, and thirteen years, based on a payback rate of $0.28/
kWh, $0.19/kWh, and $0.133/kWh respectively. Figure 8 excludes grid tie-in costs, 
which will increase the payback period, but even if these connection costs exceeded $100 
million, the project would still yield a positive NPV. The dip in the curves at years fifteen 
and seventeen represent infrastructure upgrades to enable the system to operate 
effectively for 30 years. Further discussion is found in Chapter III, Section B.  
Figure 8. Solar PV Discounted Cash Flow over 30 Years 
The payback rates for solar PV will likely not conform to any of the curves in 
Figure 8, but will blend the three. To find the most likely break-even point, the following 
analysis was conducted: NAVFAC Hawaii used 717,485 MWH of electricity in FY2013 
and Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam (JBPHH) consumed 12,061 MWH. The utility costs 
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for the ships were not included in the JBPHH power-consumption figure, despite their 
being moored at JBPHH, but the utility costs for the ships were included in the NAVFAC 
Hawaii calculation. Thus, the JBPHH utility costs are artificially low, because they 
exclude the electrical consumption of the ships. This report analyzes the maximal 
percentage of JBPHH utility costs that could be displaced with 50 MW of solar PV at 
West Loch using 12,061 MWH as a JBPHH consumption rate. 
Figure 8 shows that a 50-MW solar PV will produce 96,360 MWH in the first 
year. JBPHH FY2013 energy consumption was 12,061 MWH. 50 MW of solar PV is 
projected to produce 84,299 MWH more electricity per year, or 230 MWH more 
electricity per day, than does JBPHH. However, 50 MW of solar PV cannot entirely 
replace JBPHH energy requirements. The efficiency or utilization of the panels is 0.22; 
therefore, only 2,653 MWH (22% of 12,061 MWH/year) would be replaced by solar PV, 
provided that energy demand remain constant over the day. 2,653 MWH is 2% of the 
expected yearly output of 50-MW solar PV at West Loch. Additionally, if all JBPHH 
demand occurred during peak solar producing hours, the maximum replacement 
percentage would be no more than 13% of the total electrical production of 50 MW. 
Table 20 depicts four scenarios: 
•  Scenario 1: all electricity is sold back to the utility company at a rate of 
$0.19.  
• Scenario 2: 2% of the electricity is used to displace electricity costs for 
JBPHH at the rate of $0.28/kWh, and 98% of the electricity is sold back to 
the utility company at $0.19/kWh.  
• Scenarios 3 and 4 are identical to scenarios 1 and 3 except that the sell-
back rate to the utility was calculated at $0.133/ kWh rather than $0.19/ 
kWh. The savings as a result of the displaced costs are negligible in 
relation to the $155 million initial capital investment projected in Figure 8. 
•  
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Table 20.  Projected Savings from Supply Power to JBPHH with Solar PV 
The projected payback period in years in Figure 8 is six, nine, and thirteen for the 
$0.28/ kWh, $0.19/ kWh, and $0.133/ kWh scenarios. A hybrid approach can be taken to 
estimate the change in years of payback using interpolation, with break-even points as 
follows: 
• Scenario 1: nine years to break even (see Figure 8)
• Scenario 2: (six years to break even at $0.28/kWh)*0.02 + (nine years to
break even at $0.19/kWh)*0.98= 8.94 years
• Scenario 3: thirteen years to break even (from Figure 8)
• Scenario 4: (six years to break even at $0.28/ kWh)*0.02+ (thirteen years
to break even at $0.133/ kWh)*0.98= 12.86 years
Analysis reveals that much higher quantities would need to be replaced at $0.28/ 
kWh to have any effect in reducing the number of years to break even. 
The West Loch solar-PV system will assist NAVFAC in meeting the provisions 
of National Defense Act of 2010: Section 2842, which requires DOD facilities to use 
25% renewable energy in their total consumption (Environmental and Energy Study 
Institute, 2011). The West Loch solar PV will enable NAVFAC Hawaii to achieve nearly 
half their goal, assuming that energy consumption does not increase. Ultimately, 
NAVFAC will need to achieve 179,371 MWH of renewable energy per year by 2025 if 
electricity usage remains constant for NAVFAC. 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS OF LNG 
A. MEETING THE HAWAII CLEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE BY 2030 
The Hawaii Clean Energy Initiative (HCEI) is an aggressive plan to reduce 
harmful air pollutants while saving ratepayers money. Table 21 shows the maximum 
amount of LNG that HECO could use for generating electricity while still complying 
with the HCEI. The precise number established in this report’s calculation is 0.37 mtpa; 
however, the number can vary slightly depending on HECO’s efficiency in converting 
mmBtu of LNG to kW.  
The conversion ratio for this research was obtained from the average operating 
heat rate in 2012 for LNG obtained from the EIA website, which was 8,039 Btu/kWh 
(EIA, 2014). The conversion was taken as the average between all U.S. utility power 
producers, both public and private. The average operating heat rate has decreased from 
9,533 Btu/kWh in 2002, which equates to a greater than 15% increase in efficiency (EIA, 
2014). This report’s interpretation of the HCEI is based on kWh produced, not on Btu of 
petroleum consumed. The more inefficient the HECO power plants, the more petroleum 
can be consumed and still meet HCEI specifications. Table 21 illustrates that importing 
0.40 mpta of LNG to Oahu would allow HECO to meet the HCEI standard, assuming that 
















Table 21.    HCEI Specifics (after HECO, 2014b) (after DBEDT, 2014) 
 
 
B. FGE REPORT NET PRESENT VALUE 
Figure 9 shows the discounted cash flow from the savings projected by the FGE 
report (FGE, 2012), based on cheaper projected costs of LS diesel fuel (FGE, 2012). The 
FGE report projected prices of delivered LNG and delivered LS diesel costs from 2015–
2030 (FGE, 2013). 
The total NPV shown in Table 22 amounts to $2.3 billion, which would result in 
considerable savings in electricity costs. The negative slope in Figure 9 stems from a 
reduction in LNG from 0.65 mtpa in year 2020 to 0.40 mtpa in 2030 (FGE, 2012). This 
report assumes a linear reduction in LNG consumption at the rate of 0.025 mpta per year. 
The estimated savings are based upon projected LNG and LS diesel costs and could vary 








Figure 9.  HECO Discounted Cash Flow (after FGE, 2013) 
 








C. GALWAY REPORT NET PRESENT VALUES 
The Galway report attached a document entitled, “Revised Forecasts for LNG 
Delivered Cost to Hawaii based on the EIA AEO Early Release 2013,” February 22, 2013 
(Galway, 2013). Table 24 presents the NPV calculation of the 0.525-0.275 mtpa demand 
scenario of expected costs savings from replacing LS diesel with LNG (Galway, 2013). 
Sourcing fuel from the west coast of the United States provides the greatest savings 
(Galway, 2013) 
Table 24.   Galway Report NPV 0.525-0.275 mtpa (after Galway, 2013) 
 
 
Table 25 shows that the NPV values increase by greater than 30% as a result of 
higher quantities of LNG being imported. The findings in tables 24 and 25 are similar 
because the west coast of the United States, represented by Jordan Cove, yields a higher 
NPV in both lower and higher quantities of LNG. Additionally, the 20-year NPV in both 






Table 25.  Galway Report NPV 0.65-0.4 mtpa (after Galway, 2013) 
Table 26 displays the discounted expected costs of the 0.65-0.4 mtpa scenario that 
can be used to find the LCOE. This can be compared to other energy opportunities 
besides LS diesel, which is extremely expensive relative to LNG, coal, and solar PV. 
Table 27 displays the discounted expected costs of the 0.525-0.275 mtpa scenario that 
can be used to find the LCOE. 
Table 26.  Galway Report NPV 0.65-0.4 mtpa (after Galway, 2013) 
Table 27.  Calculations from the Galway Report to Calculated total Costs 
0.525-0.275mpta (after Galway, 2013) 
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formula provided by EIA that averages the efficiency rate for all utility power producers, 
whether public or private (EIA, 2014). The total cost of LNG, regasification, and 
transportation costs are factored and included within the “total cost discounted” in tables 
26 and 27.  
A low estimate results, for several reasons. HECO is operating very old 
generators, which are likely less efficient than the national average (Galway, 2013). In 
addition, “total cost discounted” is merely an analysis of the variable cost to put fuel into 
generators, without including the cost of operating and maintaining facilities (Galway, 
2013). Table 28 shows that the LCOE is significantly higher than the solar LCOE, which 
does not include costs for grid-connection tie-in or the additional infrastructure needed to 
stabilize the grid against rapid fluctuations due to variable generation (HSIS, 2012). 
A comparison of tables 28 and 29 shows that shorter duration assessments have 
lower LCOEs. The first reason for LCOE is that LNG prices are projected in the Galway 
report to rise faster than the 2% inflation calculated for the NPV (Galway, 2013). 
Additionally, the demand for LNG in Table 29 over the first ten years is 0.525 MTPA 
and the demand over the second ten years dwindles to 0.275 MTPA in this scenario. This 
negatively impacts economies of scale (Galway, 2013).  Table 30 shows the LCOE for 
solar PV as point of comparison to different LNG LCOE. 
Table 28.  0.65-0.40 MPTA Levelized Cost of Energy Calculated from 
Galway Report Table 4 (N-129) (after Galway, 2013) 
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Table 29.   0.525-0.275 Levelized Cost of Energy Calculated from Galway 
Report Table 5 (after Galway, 2013) 
 
 




The best way to compare these costs based on current rates is through the avoided 
energy costs published by HECO to reimburse renewable energy. The peak avoided 
energy costs have varied considerably, but from 01JUL13 to 01JUL14, the rate fluctuated 
from $0.19/ kWh to $0.23/ kWh (HECO, 2014a). This reimbursement rate reflects the 
variable costs of electrical generation and provides the best comparison to LCOE for 
LNG and solar PV, though it includes additional costs not found in either. 
D. LNG FAIR MARKET PORT COMPARABLE 
One variable that this research evaluated was the costs of different port leases in 
the United States, particularly in the LNG sector. The data for these leases was difficult 
to find and largely came from local newspapers and interest groups. Despite the 
irregularity of the data, Table 31 is useful for reference. The numbers in red are lease 
costs during the construction phase, which will change once the terminals are complete—
thus the red numbers are artificially low. A regression analysis was applied under various 
criteria, but none of the approaches resulted in findings of significance. 
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Table 31.   Comparative Analysis of Port Leases   
 
 
An interesting facet of this analysis is the relationship between lease costs and 
property taxes. Oregon LNG proudly posts on its website that its will pay $60 million a 
year in property taxes for a proposed project in Warrenton, Oregon. Most interesting is 
that Oregon LNG has a land lease of only $38,000 a year (Sickinger, 2010). While 
certainly not a direct relationship compared to other petroleum terminals, Warrenton 
seems to be an example where an extremely low lease was offered in exchange for 
extremely high property taxes. Therefore, a certain lease premium might be expected if 
the tenant will not be responsible for property taxes.  
E. PROJECTED SAVINGS IN ENERGY COSTS FROM ANNUAL 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
Tables 32 and 33 explain why HECO’s utility-cost-reduction projections are 
excessively high, based on its 2013 financial statements, and will cost CNRH $15.6 
million per year. Table 32 presents an analysis of how fuel costs correspond to HECO’s 
operating and maintenance cost and total operating costs. The analysis was conducted 
from HECO’s 2013 annual financial statement, submitted to the PUC in 2013. The report 
shows that fuel costs constitute 50% of total operating and maintenance (O&M) expenses 





Table 32.   Analysis of Fuel Costs from HECO 2013 Financial Statements 
(after HECO, 2014b) 
 
 
The FGE and Galway reports projected that replacing LS diesel with LNG would 
directly reduce fuel costs by 25%–50% (FGE, 2012) (Galway, 2013). Over the range of 
expected savings in Table 33, O&M expenses are likely to decrease 17%–30%. However, 
total operating expenses only decrease by 10%–21%. Since utility rates are no longer 
coupled to the amount of electricity sold in Hawaii, the rates are established based on the 
expected operating expense produced by HECO and approved by the PUC. The 
difference between the O&M expense and total operating expense is approximately 8%, 
or $15.6 million per year to CNRH. 






F. IMPACT OF AN LNG TERMINAL ON THE RENEWABLE ENERGY 
MARKET  
Utility-scale independent power producers (IPP) are reimbursed on a contracted 
price that is negotiated with the utility company (HECO) at a rate of no less than the 
published avoided energy rate to HECO. Presently, the avoided energy rate is based on 
oil prices and was priced at $ 0.19/kWh for peak hours on July 1, 2014 (HECO, 2014a).  
According to Table 33 a 50% reduction in fuel costs would result in a 30% 
reduction in avoided energy costs. The reduction in avoided energy costs is associated 
with operating and maintenance costs and not total operating costs; therefore, avoided 
energy costs are affected more by changes in fuel costs than overall utility costs. Table 33 
shows that a 50% reduction in fuel costs would result in a maximum 21% reduction in 
utility rates and at least a 30% reduction in avoided energy costs. A 30% reduction in 
avoided energy costs would lower the peak payback rate from $0.19/kWh to $0.133/
kWh. 
Figure 7 shows that a 30% reduction in the payback rate would have a $200 
million reduction in NPV over the 30-year life of 50-MW solar PV. The $200 million 
reduction spread over 30 years results in a reduction of $6.67 million per year in NPV 
from avoided energy costs, as seen in Table 34. 
Table 34.   Avoided Energy Costs (after HECO, 2014a) 
 
 
G. VALUE OF CARGO PORT TERMINAL 
The Navy would have to forgo other potential income opportunities to pursue the 
LNG-import terminal. If the Navy plans to lease land for an LNG terminal to reduce 
costs, it should also consider other potentially lucrative options for leasing the land. Lost 
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opportunity costs must be considered to determine the value of an LNG-import terminal 
land lease.  
This report claims no specialty in valuing commercial property leases, but notes 
that the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has leases that vary in cost from 
$40,000 to 80,000 per acre (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 2000) (The 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 2011).   
The Navy could potentially use the land designated for an LNG terminal and 
instead lease the land as a container port. If the Navy leased 100 acres of land at a rate of 
$60,000 per acre per year, the lease would be worth $6 million a year. Therefore, $6 
million is the opportunity cost that this report will use in considering negotiating leverage 
for the Navy. 
H. COST OF REMOVAL OF HOUSES FROM THE BLAST ZONE 
The area in the vicinity of Pearl City includes military housing that might fall 
within a significant accident-potential zone (APZ), in accordance with reference 
SANDIA 2004–6258. In the event that risk accident could not be mitigated, 
approximately 200 government-owned housing units would need to be relocated. The 
cost of relocating the residents was assessed at an average basic allowance housing 
(BAH) for an E-7 with dependents in Pearl Harbor, which equates to $2,835 a month (NS 
Pearl Harbor, 2014).  
200 (homes)*12 months/year*$2,835 BAH/ month= $6,804,000.00 
 
The sailors would receive BAH regardless of the scenario, yet the privatized 
company with the housing contract would likely need to be reimbursed for approximately 
$6.8 million per year. 
I. HECO’S BEST LNG IMPORT TERMINAL ALTERNATIVE 
The ZOPA process began in this project with determining the potential 
cumulative value of an LNG project. Even the least attractive project for HECO has a 
NPV in excess of $1.7 billion over ten years (Table 25). Therefore, this research 
concludes that pursuing LNG, compared with the current path is extremely beneficial. 
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The next step in the ZOPA process is comparing alternative ports for HECO. The 
goal is to analyze the difference in average annual costs among different re-gas options. 
The analysis in Table 35 takes into consideration LNG purchase costs, re-gas costs, and 
transportation costs (Galway, 2013). The data was taken from a range of delivered 
quantities from 0.85 mtpa to 0.28 mtpa (Galway, 2013). 




Figure 10 is the visual depiction of Table 35 with the exception of breaking each 
site option savings into various demand scenarios. The numerical computations can be 
found in Appendix B.     
 
Figure 10.  Total Re-gas and Transportation Costs for LNG per Year over 
Various Quantities of Shipment (after Galway, 2013) 
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The Pearl Harbor dockside, full-size FSRU is approximately $50 million less 
expensive, on average, than different shipment quantities from 0.85, 0.65, 0.53, 0.55, 
0.40, and 0.28 mtpa (Galway, 2013). The Pearl Harbor FSRU is less expensive at every 
consumption level, with the exception of shipments of 0.28 mtpa. Providing that all non-
renewable electricity produced in Hawaii comes from LNG, HECO can use 
approximately 0.40 mtpa and still meet HCEI requirements.  
This table suggests that if an equal probability of shipment exists over the stated 
range of analysis, HECO would pay no more than $50 million a year more for the Pearl 
Harbor option than for the next least-expensive option, which is the 2 x FSRU–double 
buoy offshore option.  
J. ZONE OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT FOR AN LNG-IMPORT 
TERMINAL  
The LNG-import terminal is a commonly beneficial project for both CNRH and 
HECO. Table 36 shows that HECO would benefit by $50 million a year in using Pearl 
Harbor over the least expensive alternative. CNRH benefits from lower utility costs of 
20%, according to the overlap from HECO’s and this study’s estimates (CNRH, 2014b). 
A 20% reduction in FY2013 CNRH utility costs of $195 million would result in savings 
of $39 million per year. CNRH would likely pay the cost of $6.8 million per year to 
subsidize privatized military housing away from the blast area.  
Table 36.   Zone of Possible Agreement  
 
 
The ZOPA process shows that CNRH should expect to be paid by HECO within a 
range from $50 million per year to negative $32.2 million per year. At any point on the 
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scale, both parties are better off than they would have been if they had chosen not to 
trade. ZOPA theory suggests that both sides will migrate toward the middle of the ZOPA 
before reaching a deal (Spangler, 2013). Applying ZOPA logic to this negotiation, the 
lease would be valued at $8.9 million per year. 
Ultimatum theory also applies to this negotiation because both parties are able to 
benefit from the deal and both parties have to consent to the deal. The theory is principled 
on fairness. The party who stands to benefit least will often not consent to a deal unless a 
payout of 20% or greater is received (Thaler and Mullainathan, 2008).  
HECO’s least-lucrative LNG scenario has an NPV of $1.7 billion over ten years; 
therefore, HECO stands to benefit in inflation-adjusted dollars by $170 million per year. 
The logic of ultimatum theory states that CNRH will not agree to a deal unless it receives 
compensation of no less than 20% of $170 million per year, which would be $34 million 
per year. A lease of $34 million a year is well within the ZOPA window.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The conclusions and recommendations of this study should be admitted as key in 
any discussion of the proposed projects. In particular the data analyzed from the FGE 
report and the Galway report when compared to HECO’s 2013 financial statements 
revealed that a 20–30% reduction in utility costs as a result of LNG is unlikely.   
This research presents a framework of some of the costs and benefits of building 
solar PV and LNG infrastructure on JBPHH. This report found that both projects are 
beneficial to CNRH providing that the analyzed assumptions are realistic. A high degree 
of uncertainty can be placed on the NPV of the solar-PV project and the LNG terminal, 
which are largely dependent on the differential between the cost of LNG and LS diesel 
from 2020–2030. While this report analyzed the best information available, fluctuations 
in expected costs can drastically change the benefits of projects.        
The findings in this study can be used for further analysis regarding the PUC’s 
willingness to approve an LNG-import terminal and the expected disposal costs of an 
LNG-import terminal.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The major conclusions of this study are as follows: 
(1) Potential Reductions in Utility Rates Have Been Overstated 
Hawaii Electric Company has overstated projected reductions in utility rates from 
a transition to liquid natural gas. HECO has communicated to CNRH that it expects 
utility costs to drop by 20–30% if an LNG-import terminal is built (CNRH, 2013). This 
level of reduction is unlikely, because even a 50% reduction in fuel cost (the maximum 
fuel savings projected by the FGE and Galway reports) would result in only a 21% 
reduction in HECO’s 2013 total operating expense (See Table 33). This report estimates a 
10%–21% reduction in the utility rate as the maximum possible, assuming HECO 
maintains the same operating margins. 
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(2) Further Research is Needed to Determine Whether LNG Will Reduce 
Rates More than Renewable Energy  
The average annual rate to produce electricity with solar photovoltaic is projected 
to be $0.088/kWh. The average annual rate to deliver LNG to Hawaii was calculated as 
$0.10-$0.18/kWh. However, these rates do not directly translate into utility rates. The 
solar-PV average annual rate does not take into consideration grid tie-in costs, advanced 
smart-grid technology, or required utility-scale storage to accommodate fluctuations in 
current under dynamic weather conditions. The LNG average annual rate does not 
consider the costs of transportation from an import site to a power plant, operating the 
power plants, modernization, or any other costs. While replacing LS diesel with LNG 
will almost certainly result in savings, further research is required to determine if LNG 
will reduce utility rates significantly more than renewable energy such as solar PV. 
(3) An LNG-Import Terminal is Expected to Benefit All Parties  
Building an LNG-import terminal in Pearl Harbor presents a winning situation for 
both CNRH and HECO. CNRH benefits by $32.2 million per year in electrical cost 
savings (Table 36), and HECO benefits by $170–$460 million per year on average, based 
on the projected NPV (tables 23 and 24). The benefits of building an LNG-import 
terminal are much greater than either party’s alternative. 
(4) HECO’s Best Alternative LNG Site is Significantly More Expensive   
HECO’s best alternative for a LNG site is $50 million more expensive than Pearl 
Harbor (Table 35). CNRH will likely benefit from $32.2 million per year from reduced 
utility costs from an LNG terminal. ZOPA theory suggests the most likely lease 
agreement would be at the midpoint between acceptable terms. The midpoint between 
HECO and CNRH is $8.9 million per year. 
(5) Ultimatum Theory 
Ultimatum theory suggests that in the event that both parties stand to gain from a 
zero-sum transaction, the party with the lessor terms will not agree to the deal without a 
payout of 20% or greater (Thaler and Mullainathan, 2008). This perspective places the 
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lease rate at no less than 20% of HECO’s economic benefit of $170 million per year—
that is, at $34 million per year.  
(6) Benefits of Solar PV 
Solar PV is a very attractive project because of a $280-800 million NPV for a 50-
MW system at West Loch, as shown in Figure 7. However, the NPV does not include 
grid tie-in costs, required smart-grid costs, or energy-storage costs to compensate for 
fluctuations in current. This study found that CNRH could invest a maximum of $280-
$800 million in the excluded costs and still have a positive NPV. The project’s cost 
savings are largely dependent upon whether the generated renewable energy can displace 
the current utility rate of $0.28/ kWh or will be reimbursed at much lower rate by the 
utility company. 
(7) Indirect Impact of an LNG terminal 
Building an LNG terminal will reduce the rate at which the utility company 
reimburses renewable energy. A 30% reduction in the utility payback rate results in a 
$200 million NPV loss for a 50-MW solar-PV system over 30 years (Figure 7). The 30% 
reduction in the renewable-energy payback rate is consistent with Table 33. The 
renewable-energy payback rate is determined by avoided energy costs (a component of 
operating and maintenance costs), and utility rates are determined by total operating 
costs. This means the yearly cash flow paid by the utility for energy from solar PV could 
be 30% less. The only way to avoid drastic reductions in payback rates is to enter into a 
long-term contract with HECO.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To secure best outcomes for Navy negotiations, the following recommendations 
are made: 
(1) Commission a Special Report for Legal and Environmental Issues 
The 50-MW solar-PV project and the LNG-import terminal are potentially worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars to CNRH and billions of dollars to HECO over the next 
decade. This study strongly recommends commissioning a professional report on legal 
 61 
and environmental issues, including data on commercial port leases that is not publically 
available. HECO should be engaged to determine their initial bargaining position. 
(2) Investigate the Benefits of a JBPHH Electrical Island 
CNRH should pursue a 50-MW solar-PV system at West Loch. Further research 
is needed on the ability to displace energy costs of $0.28/ kWh. This report found that an 
$800-million initial investment for grid tie-in costs, smart-grid infrastructure, and energy-
storage would yield a positive NPV. Further research to investigate the economics of 
smart-grid infrastructure and electrical-energy storage is advised. 
(3) Build a BESS 
CNRH should investigate partnering with HECO to build a 2MW battery energy-
storage system (BESS) (Shimogawa, 2014). A BESS would be best used in close 
proximity to large renewable-energy generation systems. A BESS would benefit HECO 
by preventing large fluctuations in voltage, which degrade grid security, and also provide 
emergency power if installed in conjunction with a smart grid. CNRH could potentially 
use the BESS to power critical infrastructure during blackouts that coincide with 
national-security threats requiring immediate military response.  
(4) Commission a LNG-Import Terminal Disposal Report 
The disposal costs of an LNG-Import terminal could be expensive. The magnitude 
of the costs should be analyzed before proceeding with the project because they 
significantly impact the NPV.  
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APPENDIX A. 50-MW SOLAR-PV NPV 
The following tables have been included to show the assumptions that were used 
in this research. Table 37 shows the solar-PV assumptions that were used in calculating 
the solar-PV NPV in Tables 38, 39, and 40. 
Table 37.   Assumptions for 50MW Solar PV NPV  
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APPENDIX B. LNG CALCULATIONS 
Appendix B shows the calculations used for calculating the NPV from the FGE 
report as well as the NPV from two different Galway report scenarios. This appendix 
concludes with the numbers used to determine that the Pearl Harbor LNG terminal was 
$50 million less expensive than alternative options. 
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